Chinese chess

Donald Trump’s second term as the president of the United States is only two months old, but one major focus of his foreign policy is already clear: an aggressive approach to trade with China. On February 1, Trump ordered a blanket 10 percent tariff on Chinese imports into the U.S. The next week, his administration announced 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum, aiming to end Chinese domination of the global markets for the metals.

Beijing’s response to the tariffs has been measured: It imposed import duties on U.S. fossil fuels, farm equipment, cars, and some agricultural products, and it launched an anti-monopoly investigation of Google. 

But since Trump’s victory last November, Beijing has been pursuing other plans that could have bigger implications for its competition with Washington. Chinese leaders invited India’s top security official for a visit in December; Beijing made concessions to Delhi on trade and travel issues; and the Chinese also volunteered to start talks on China’s and India’s long-disputed border—a step they’d long refused to take.

Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Japan’s prime minister in November, and in January the countries resumed ruling-party exchanges, which had been suspended for seven years.

Also meanwhile, once Trump shut down most operations of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which ran economic-development and health-care programs in many of the world’s poorest countries, China stepped forward to offer Cambodia US$4.4 million to clear landmines left over from the Vietnam War, a project USAID—the United States Agency for International Development—had previously supported.

What’s China trying to do here?

Scott Kennedy is a senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and the author or editor of several books on China. Kennedy says the full picture of China’s strategy to address the new U.S. administration is still taking shape. In some areas, Beijing is largely reacting in kind to the White House, welcoming friendly moves or retaliating against unfriendly ones. At the same time, though, Chinese leaders are on a diplomatic offensive with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and the West. And they see two good reasons for doing it: They want to improve ties in case Washington tries to isolate them—but they also see big potential gains if Washington’s relations with traditional allies really deteriorate …

Michael Bluhm: What would you say we know of Beijing’s biggest concerns about the new Trump administration?