Sep. 18, 2024 |
A waiting game in Tehran. Speaking at a news conference with domestic and foreign journalists for more than two hours, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said on September 16 that Tehran was “exercising restraint” by not retaliating against Israel for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran on July 31—after attending Pezeshkian’s inauguration—in a military guesthouse. Reports conflict about whether he was killed by a projectile fired from the air outside the house or by a remotely detonated bomb inside; regardless, the assassination embarrassed Iran and prompted promises of retribution by top Iranian officials.
Pezeshkian says Iran is holding back on retaliation because it doesn’t want the war in Gaza to escalate into a wider conflict. And yet Iran’s proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen—continue to launch rocket and missile attacks on Israel.
On September 17, hundreds of Hezbollah pagers exploded in Lebanon and Syria, killing 11 and wounding more than 2,700—including Iran’s envoy to Beirut—according to Lebanon’s health minister. The next day, hundreds of Hezbollah walkie-talkies also exploded, killing 25 and injuring hundreds. Reports indicate Israel had managed to implant tiny explosives in the devices, which could then be detonated remotely. In April this year, after Israel bombed Tehran’s consulate in Damascus, Syria, killing several military commanders, Iran responded by launching some 300 missiles against Israel—though Israel managed to intercept nearly all of them.
So why is Tehran not taking revenge this time?
It may be uncertain, but as Vali Nasr explored in February, Iran is quite happy with much of the status quo in the region—and it sees itself as gaining prominence and power from the Gaza war. To Tehran’s leaders, Nasr says, the conflict has turned global public opinion against Israel and the U.S.—and caused a lot of friction between the longtime allies. Now and in the near future, Tel Aviv and Washington will have to spend a lot of time and energy dealing with Hamas and the Palestinian question—leaving less time and energy to focus on whatever Iran is up to.
—Michael Bluhm
